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CAN WE SHARE ETHICAL VIEWS
WITH OTHER RELIGIONS?
Leaders of world religions, such as the
Dalai Lama, have claimed that the world's major
religions have a central body of ethical
agreement.!
However, some recent writers in
Christian theology have argued that no
principles could be shared across religious and
cultural lines. They argue that the ethics or the
ethical contents of one religion or culture are
not detachable or transferable from one culture
or religion to another. From their arguments, it
would follow that one could not share the
ethical views of a member of another religion or
culture.
These theologians' arguments seem to me
to be of great importance, for if we believed we
shared no standard of ethical judgment with
members of other religions and cultures, would
we not be led to deny any basis for agreeing
with them on any moral judgment?
If these arguments were sound, would
not all ethical judgments become relative to the
authority of one's own particular cultural or
religious tradition?
---------- 1 ----------
Concerns and questions such as these
lead me to examine some of those arguments of
the theologians. In doing so, I propose to show
that there are ethical norms that are applicable
across cultural and religious boundaries.
In looking at their insights, one
encounters the key question of whether it is
possible to share an ethic or share an ethical or
moral view with members of another tradition.
(In discussing these views, I will use the terms
"ethical" and "moral" interchangeably, to refer
to a generally accepted view by which we judge
actions to be right or wrong. I take it that it is
fundamental to the meaning of being moral or
ethical that one should act out of respect for
one's fellow human beings and that actions will
be judged right or wrong on that basis.)
We should note the ambiguity of this
"share-an-ethic" expression and the possible
confusion arising from its use. In speaking of
sharing an ethic, we may be speaking of sharing
ethical principles, such as the concept of law or
the Golden Rule, or we may be speaking of
sharing an ethical code or an entire way of life.
The latter, the notion of sharing an ethical code
or way of life, would include all the specific
customs and practices that can enter into the
---------- 2 ----------
moral judgments of a society. An ethic-as-a-
way-of-Iife would include such practices as
polygamy, the subordination of females to male
siblings, and specific property rights. Such
customs are elements of a culture's or a
religion's ethic: expectations are built around
them and actions are often justified or
condemned insofar as they are seen to be in
accord with such customs and practices.
That ethical principles or standards are
distinct from such customs and from ethics-as-a-
way-of-Iife will be plain from the fact that we
apply principles such as the Golden Rule or the
standard of fairness and justice to criticize or
modify customs. We do so, for example, when
we criticize the unfairness of the practice of
apartheid in another culture or criticize the
unfairness of practices which are seen to be
suppressing women's rights in our own culture.
In arguing that we can and do share
ethical views with members of other cultures
and religions, I will be arguing that we share
ethical principles or standards, not that we share
the total context of ethical attitudes and customs
of other cultures and religions.
The appeal to the context or setting of an
ethical judgment is important to theological
---------- 3 ----------
arguments such as those of Stewart Sutherland,in
"Religion, Ethics and Action."2 He says that
the reason people confusedly speak of sharing
ethical principles is "that many philosophers and
theologians seem not to have asked a series of
questions starting with: 'What is it to share an
ethic?"'3 Sutherland focuses on that question.
He holds that ethical views are not transferable
or detachable from their total body of religious
belief and therefore cannot be shared. An ethic
that judges actions must do so by means of its
beliefs and for Sutherland both the norm of
judgment and the action judged must be viewed
in the total context of the cultural fabric of
belief.
One of Sutherland's central arguments
begins with the familiar point that the moral
description of an action must take in the agent's
intentions and the justifying supporting reasons
and beliefs. The person's reasons for what
he/she does determine how we should describe
the act: if an act of seeming generosity is done
for the sake of making a display, we would not,
if we detected the intent, give the person high
moral marks, because the act is not directed by
any kind of moral concern.
So, Sutherland notes, we should be wary
---------- 4 ----------
of precepts or rules within different cultures
that seem to prescribe the same thing, for they
may well refer to acts done for significantly
different ends and therefore not refer to the
same kind of action at all. Sutherland's
example: we may superficially describe the
action of a Christian, Brendan, and a Marxist,
Barry, in terms of their immediate intent: we
might describe actions of both that they are
driving truckloads of food to give to refugees.
But that description may not capture what might
be the Marxist Barry's aim: he, drawing on his
larger cosmic Marxist beliefs, might aim to
promote a revolution; and it might not capture
what might be the Christian Brendan's larger
goal: namely, to assist fellow creatures in
fulfilment of God's bidding. Sutherland's point
is that an adequate understanding and
description of what they are doing will take in
those larger intents or goals and that these goals
are linked to their more comprehensive Marxist
or Christian beliefs. Sutherland concludes that
in judging an action to be right or wrong, we
must do so in relation to these broader cultural
contexts if we are to speak meaningfully of
sharing ethical views. And, Sutherland adds,
people from different theological perspectives,
---------- 5 ----------
such as a Marxist and a Christian, cannot be
said to share an ethic because in the end they
would disagree radically on how to characterize
their actions, and indeed in what their intentions
and, ipso facto, their actions were.4
While acknowledging that the two
descriptions of the actions may overlap at times
(in the description of both as "driving the truck
to the refugeees," for example), Sutherland
holds that it is a delusion to hold that
descriptions can overlap in all morally relevant
intentions behind an action.
He holds that those who argue for
universal standards represent human conduct as
detachable from the thought that directs it, thus
providing themselves with a superficial and
confused account of 'sameness of action' and
'sameness of ethic'.s
For Sutherland, it is only by such
superficial and confused accounts that they
could arrive at the notion that members of
different religions or cultures could share
ethical views.
But Sutherland's example shows only
that a complete specification of the two agents'
intentions may involve reference to different
ethical views, not that it must do so. Surely
---------- 6 ----------
r(1presentatives of different religions and
ideologies often do share morally significant
reasons for their actions. Take Sutherland's own
example, of the Marxist and the Christian. In
point of fact, many people have described
themselves as Christian Marxists. Some
Marxists and some Christians could (in driving
food to refugees) be acting purely on their felt
obligation to others as persons. Many of them
do. Neither need share all the cosmic principles
that are sometimes associated with their
traditions. When both act out of concern for the
suffering we find agreement in moral intent:
both may consider and want to describe their
own actions simply as providing needed help for
their fellow creatures for whose well-being they
were concerned. Thus both their actions should
be described as flowing from the same principle,
whatever the differences might be between the
ultimate cosmologies or belief systems. For
people need not subscribe to all of a belief
system and, as we shall see, there is often no
single orthodox version of what beliefs are to be
included in a belief system. Thus the fact they
can be described as members of traditions that
are opposed in some of its versions does not
show that those members can not be in
---------- 7 ----------
agreement on significant ethical principles.
Sutherland apparently seeks to account
for such agreement as this, while discounting its
importance for his argument. For he suggests
that those who invoke such agreement suppose
that "certain distinctive ethical beliefs
historically took root in Christianity, but now
belong, in full flower, equally to secular world
views."? His response to those who would
advance such a view is that "even if the
historical hypothesis were true," Christian
ethical beliefs could not be absorbed into non-
religious beliefs "without mutation."
Sutherland apparently here assumes that
the Christian tradition is the only historical
source for its ethical beliefs and that these
beliefs are incompatible with a non-theistic
view. But, in point of fact, a version of the
Golden Rule (surely a central feature of the
Christian tradition) also appears in all the major
religions of the world. And there is ample
evidence to show that it emerged in a number of
world views independently of and prior to its
emergence in Christianity.
Among those earlier places it appeared
was in non-theistic Confucianism, where it is
written: "Is there anyone maxim which ought to
be acted upon throughout one's life? Surely the
maxim of loving kindness is such---Do not unto
others what you would not they should do unto
you." Or consider the Buddhist saying: "Hurt
not others with that which pains yourself." Or
the Islamic: "No one of you is a believer until
he loves for his brother what he loves for
himself." Or the Sikh: "As thou deem est
thyself, so deem others."s
Are there significant elements common
to them all? Do the members of these various
traditions share an ethical view? They patently
agree on the point that defines what is essential
to a moral view: all require us to act out of
regard for persons. They also agree on the point
that we are to consider our act from the
standpoint of the person who will be affected by
it.
Nor can we discount the fact that these
principles are shared because of Sutherland's
claim that moral rules that seem the same suffer
"mutation" by being subordinated to or
substituted by some other global beliefs of the
religion. For the versions of the Golden Rule,
as they are phrased in the various religions,
preclude such modification; they each indicate
that this particular kind of moral concern is
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primary for the faith. All of them declare that
their primary mission is ethical and that the
version of the Rule is essential to that mission.
The Rule for Confucians is that the maxim that
ought always be acted on; for others it is what
is required for the fulfilment of all the law.
Islam claims "no one of you is a believer until
he loves for his brother what he loves for
himself."
As Peter Donovan has observed in his
interesting study on sharing ethical principles,8
a striking example of people from different
religious orientations sharing ethical principles is
found in the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights. In it people from all the various
religions and cultures of the world committed
themselves to principles of justice. Theirs was
an agreement in intent; they adopted a principle
in order to protect the rights of individuals.
Theirs were rules to be implemented in
joint political action and policy for the future;
for that they must be taken in the same sense by
all. These seem to be ethical principles that are
shared across religious and cultural lines.
But Sutherland (and the other theologians
who follow him) may finally want to ask not
whether one can share principles but whether it
---------- 10 ----------
is religiously acceptable to do so. For he
suggests that moral principles may "have to wait
on metaphysical and theological beliefs."9
Further he seeks to buttress his position that
ethical principles have to be taken in their total
context by asking "whether Christianity adds
anything to an already agreed and shared set of
moral beliefs. He holds that, "It may add
something either in terms of content...or in terms
of formal justification for such a set of beliefs."
10
In raising the issue in this way, he has
shifted his position. He began by denying that
different religions could share any ethical views,
holding that our belief in any apparent
agreements in action would be dispelled when
the acts were adequately described under their
larger principled intentions. The original
question was not whether Christianity adds
anything but whether we can meaningfully
speak of what he does speak of when he asks
the question; when he asks whether it adds to
an "already agreed and shared set of moral
beliefs," he admits that moral views can be
shared.
His point now seems to be: Is it possible
to share such beliefs in a religiously legitimate
way? He asks must these principles not "wait
---------- 11 ----------
on metaphysical and theological beliefs" that
provide the kind of justification provided by
"Christianity"? He seems to want to say that an
ethical principle cannot be adopted without
justifying reasons and satisfactory reasons must
be grounded in an understanding of the world as
that is laid out in Christian theology. Other
theologians have adopted such a view. It
becomes evident that Sutherland is claiming that
adequate principles must be connected to true
metaphysical doctrine when he declares his
opposition to any view that "assumes that two
men may agree about what ought to be done
without necessarily agreeing about the way the
world is." 11
One must agree that it is important that
we be as clear as possible about the facts which
would justify a belief. One cannot have very
strong reasons for agreeing on an ethical
principle without seeing how it is grounded in
the way the world is and the way we are. To be
rationally convinced of the necessity of a belief
we must be able to relate it to how it must work
in the world.
But the fact is that Christians, like
followers of other religions, have had to hold on
to beliefs amid disagreements and uncertainties
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about how those beliefs might be grounded;
moreover, these ultimate Christian metaphysical
beliefs often do little to justify ethical principles.
Many aspects of a global religious view,
such as the doctrine of the trinity, the doctrine
of the creation and that of the virgin birth add a
special flavor to the Christian tradition but, as
Peter Donovan observes,12 they add no ethical
content to a principle such as the Golden Rule.
They do not clarify the specific content of the
Rule nor do they provide any rational
justification for such a principle. What they add
makes no ethical difference and so could not
preclude our sharing the principle with other
religious traditions. There can be no point in
"waiting on" agreement in points of doctrine or
"metaphysical beliefs" if they are empty of
ethical content.
Moreover, Sutherland's appeal to the
justifying power of Christianity misleadingly
suggests that the term "Christianity" refers to
only one body of doctrine and that all who call
themselves Christians agree on doctrine or agree
about the way the world is. But this is not true:
there are sects who describe themselves as
Christian for whom there is no body of formal
doctrine besides the ethical principle of having
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compassion for persons. Are we to say that
Quakers, for example, are not truly Christian?
Or, passing over the Quakers as exceptions to
his claims, are there differences between other
Christian sects? Have there been important
differences in doctrine between other Christian
sects? Is meat from a pig pork? Does Tuesday
follow Monday?
I am uneasy about Sutherland's
suggestion that a person's moral principles are
not to be respected unless its proponents agree
with us on points of doctrine. I am uneasy
because I recall some of the sad chapters in our
history. I am reminded of a recent statement by
the Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the radical
cleric whose followers are linked to two New
York bombing conspiracies; he told an
immigration judge that he supports the
overthrow of governments, like that of the
United States, because they are not properly
grounded in Islamic law. Of course, we find
similar examples in the postures of Christian and
Jewish religious leaders.
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg remarked during her Senate
confirmation hearings that "The richness and
diversity of this country is a treasure," but
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cautioned that "it's a constant challenge, too, to
remain tolerant and respectful of one another."
It is equally a challenge--and a challenge to the
peace of the world--to remain respectful of those
from many diverse traditions around the world.
The historical fact is that all religious
traditions have been and are in a process of
development; what any sect proclaims as
doctrine may well have been contested within
that sect in the past and by other sects at
present.
So, one has doubts about Sutherland's
suggestion that ethical beliefs must "wait on
metaphysical and theological" agreement to
justify them; it seems we may have to keep
waiting.
Given the disagreements of the world's
great religions on their theological principles,
why is it that they should have come to
agreement on moral principles in the way that
they have? The agreement is particularly
striking in the case of the Golden Rule. Why
should versions of it be held with such
conviction that each of the religions should
declare it to be the basic moral standard? What
intuition, what sense of who and what we are
has fuelled that certainty? Why should the
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citizens of the world have come by such a sense
independently of one another?
We find a clue, I think, in the way that
some of the religions have phrased their versions
of the Golden Rule. A recurring theme of that
phrasing concerns how we should conceive of
ourselves. Jainism says we should regard others
"as we regard our own selr'; Sikhism
commands: "As thou deemest thyself, so deem
others." Taoism bids us to regard others as we
would regard ourselves. The thrust of all of
them is that we should think of ourselves in the
same way that we think of others. Their point
of agreement on the way the world is morally is
that we are to conceive of ourselves as
essentially the same as one another for moral
purposes. For all of them, moral action and
moral judgment brings us to a kind of reciprocal
awareness with one another.
How do we get into the business of
saying that all people must be conceived--
regarded, deemed--to be the same or equal? It
seems to be not so much a question of what the
world is as a question of what we are and how
we must conceive of ourselves and our relation
to each other. Why must we so conceive of
ourselves?
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I think the answer lies in our moral
make-up--in our moral anatomy, to coin a
phrase.
One aspect of this is that we feel
ourselves to be like one another: we naturally
and spontaneously feel sympathy for one
another. We respond to another's hurt and
delight in their joy. It may be said that such
responses are not simply matters of feeling,
since our responses often depend on an
intellectual understanding of another's situation.
That is true, in a sense: our intellectual
understanding of a situation can heighten our
feelings to a dramatic intensity. But any such
intellectual elaboration must build on the native
capacity and that capacity exists before it is
directed by any explanation or description. An
infant cries over another child's pain and exults
in its delight long before it can speak or
appreciate intellectual distinctions. Almost at
birth it begins to take an interest in the interest
of others, seeing others as kindred spirit,
engaging in reciprocating awareness with them.
Michael Pritchard has argued that without such
moral sensibilities there could be no moral life
at allY
As adults, we can try to suppress or
---------- 17 ----------
deny the importance of such feelings, perhaps by
pretending to be purely rational creatures. But
sympathy is fundamental: it is part of our wiring
and it repeatedly has its effects, in spite of our
poses or metaphysical doctrines which would
deny it.
Another aspect of our makeup which
makes such a conception necessary is found in
what makes formal communication possible,
namely, our language. In order to form a
conception of ourselves that we can
communicate to another we must use a
conception of person that is equally applicable
to others. The adjectives and attributes that we
would apply to ourselves must be applicable to
others. If I want to describe myself, I must
describe myself in the same terms that others
use to describe themselves: anger, fear, anxiety
and the rest must apply to all. I must use the
terms in the same sense: my anger must be like
your anger, or it can't properly be called anger;
if I want to tell you about my sorrow, I must see
it and speak about it as like others' sorrow.
I cannot elect to describe myself in terms
that apply only to me. I cannot construct a
private language by means of which I can
uniquely conceive of, and communicate about,
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myself. It cannot serve as a language by which
I can communicate unless the meanings are held
in common by others, unless it is a public
language, whose terms carry the same meanings
for others. This is true, of course, for all
languages and all cultures. So, as
communicating members of society, each of us
must conceive of ourselves as fundamentally
like others, as persons responding to persons, if
we conceive of ourselves in a way that can be
communicated.
This is an idea that contemporary
philosophical studies have done much to clarify,
but it is an idea that must be dimly apprehended
by everyone who learns to speak a language. In
order for anyone to learn how to use the term
"apple", they must consider that others are
seeing what they are seeing when they use the
term. In order for anyone to correctly describe
their feelings as sorrowful, they must take it that
others have felt the same. And the same holds
true for every term that one can employ to
describe oneself in the world. So, the notion
that each of us is a person responding to others
as persons is an idea that must be a part of
everyone's experience. One can see why the
idea would have emerged among all people who
---------- 19 ----------
reflected seriously about the moral life.
Thus our language and our feelings must
provide powerful impetus for the idea that each
of us must conceive of others as like ourselves.
This is true, of course, for people of all
religions and cultures.
These are truths about the way the
world is that can provide some justification for
a version of the Golden Rule and can indicate
why it is a moral principle that has a claim to
universal validity for all societies. For, if the
very meaning of the term "moral" is that if we
are to be moral we must treat others with
respect, and if we must conceive of others as
like ourselves, it will follow that if we aim to
act morally, we must treat others as we would
like to be treated if we were in their situation.
In brief we must endorse the rule, "Do unto
others as you would have others do unto you."
These facts about our moral anatomy
show why we can and do share ethical views
with people from other religious traditions.
Note that the rule is totally transferable and
detachable from any moorings in theological or
metaphysical principles. Doctrines about the
nature of the trinity or about the origin of the
world are not needed for our understanding of it.
---------- 20 ----------
These same ideas are closely related to
other moral principles that are acknowledged in
societies around the world. All societies
acknowledge the concepts of law and fairness.
Both concepts require that persons be treated
alike, that persons in similar situations be treated
similarly. These ideas are sometimes expanded
into what we, in contemporary ethics, sometimes
call the Generalization Principle: What is right
or wrong for one person must be right or wrong
for any similar person in a similar situation.
Patently, all of these ideas are supported by the
same facts about ourselves that provided support
for the Golden Rule.
The Generalization Principle, the notion
of fairness and the concept of law lay down
one's moral right to equal treatment, individually
and under the law .. Thus they lay the ground
for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
We can not consider any of these
principles as isolated or insignificant rules. We
do not need to consider an~' of them to be
tentative or held simply on authority. We can
see factual reasons for each of them and we can
see how they are interwoven and mutually
supported by chains of reasoning. Our reasons
for holding to them cut to our awareness of their
---------- 21 ----------
place in our moral and political institutions; we
can see that they are at the center of our life in
a community.
I hope I have shown that members of
different religious traditions and cultures do
share ethical principles.
Against those who claim that such
principles are non-transferable, I have argued:
1. The various religions' statements of
these moral principles claim that
these moral principles are primary
and definitive for their religion.
2. The global metaphysical statements
(which are supposed to transform
these principles) do add
something, but what they add is
often of no moral relevance. So
they do not alter and could not
exclude them as moral
principles.
3. There is widespread disagreement
among members of each religion
about those ultimate, supposedly
justifying beliefs, so the appeal to
the Christian view of the world
may merely introduce occasion
---------- 22 ----------
for quarrel.
4. In suggesting that no principle can be
considered adequate until it is
qualified by its place in one's
own total world view, the
theological argument gives cause
for concern because it bears
striking similarities to the views
of intolerant religious leaders in
our past and present .
5. Contrary to the suggestion of the
theological arguments, the fact is
that there are a number of
principles which have been and
are held in common by followers
of the world's major religions:
the Golden Rule, fairness, the
concept of law and of individual
rights.
6. These principles are interdependent
and have been repeatedly and
explicitly invoked for guiding
cooperative activity and shaping
shared policy; thus there is no
reason to suppose that that their
proponents do not hold to
common meanings and intentions.
---------- 23 ----------
7. While it's important that agreement in
principle be grounded in some
agreement on the way the world
is, we find factual reasons for
holding to these principles by
looking to our moral nature and to
our way of learning and using
language.
By these arguments I hope to have
shown that the world's major religions do share
ethical principles which they hold to be valid for
any moral society, and that these are principles
that are firmly grounded in what people from
different religions and cultures can agree to be
"the way the world is." Whatever their
differences of global, metaphysical doctrines,
members of these religions can find justifying
reasons for upholding these principles that are
central to their moral and political life.
---------- 24 ----------
Notes
1. A Human Approach to World Peace, by
His Holiness Tenzin Gyatso, The
Fourteenth Dalai Lama (Wisdom
Publications, 1984), p.13.
2. The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian
Theology, ed. B. Hebblethwaite and S.
Sutherland (Cambridge University Pr.,
1982), pp. 153-67.
3. Ibid., p.157.
4. Ibid, p.164.
5. Ibid., p.165.
6. Sutherland, ibid., p.156.
7. The World's Eleven Religions, by S.G.
Champion (N.Y.: Dutton, 1945), xviii.
8. "Do Different Religions Share Moral
Common Ground?", by Peter Donovan.
Religious Studies, Vol. 22, (pp. 367-75),
p.372.
---------- 25 ----------
9. Sutherland, ibid., p.156.
10. Ibid. My emphasis.
11. Ibid., p. 164.
12. Donovan, ibid.
13. See On Becoming Responsible, by Michael
Pritchard, (Kansas: University of Kansas
Press, 1991), Chapters 1-3.
---------- 26 ----------
BIOGRAPHY
Professor Hannaford is a Professor of
Philosophy at Ripon College in Ripon,
Wisconsin. He has published many articles on
ethics and political philosophy in leading
philosophical journals and is the author of a
recently published book entitled, Moral Anatomy
and Moral Reasoning (University Press of
Kansas, 1993).
---------- 27 ----------
CENTER PUBLICATIONS
VOLUME I
No.1, October, 1987
Ethical Norms in Science
Rachelle D. Hollander
National Science Foundation
No.2, January, 1988
Ethics in Academia
Diether Haenicke
Western Michigan University
No.3, May, 1988
Thoughts on Keeping My Mouth Shut
David H. Smith
Poynter Center
Indiana University
---------- 28 ----------
No.4, June, 1988
Affirmative Action Defended
Laurence Thomas
Oberlin College
VOLUME II
No.1, November, 1988
Biomedical Ethics in the Soviet Union
Richard DeGeorge
University of Kansas
No.2, January, 1989
Do Professors Need Professional Ethics as Much
as Doctors and Lawyers?
James W. Nickel
University of Colorado
No.3, February, 1989
Ethical Dilemmas in Health Care:
Is Society Sending a Mixed Message?
John V. Hartline, M.D.
Neonatology, Kalamazoo, Michigan
o. 4, March, 1989
Codes of Ethics in Business
Michael Davis
Illinois Institute of Technology
No.5, May, 1989
Should I (Legally) Be My Brother's Keeper?
Gilbert Geis
University of California--Irvine
VOLUME III
No.1, October, 1989
Surrogate Parenting:
The Michigan Legislation
Lucille Taylor, Majority Counsel
Michigan State Senate
Paul Denenfeld, Legal Director
ACLU Fund of Michigan
No.2, December, 1989
Morality Versus Slogans
Bernard Gert
Dartmouth College
No.3, February, 1990
Ethical Reasoning and Analysis: The Elements
Martin Benjamin
Michigan State University
---------- 29 ----------
No.4, April, 1990
Women's Dilemma: Is it Reasonable to be
Rational?
Harriet Baber
University of San Diego
VOLUME IV
No.1, July, 1990
Higher-Order Discrimination
Adrian M.S. Piper
Wellesley College
No.2, November, 1991
Television Technology and Moral Literacy
Clifford G. Christians
University of Illinois--Urbana
No.3, May, 1991
Virtue and the Health Professions
Janet Pisaneschi
Western Michigan University
VOLUME V
No.1, November, 1991
Owning and Controlling Technical Information
Vivian Weil
Illinois Institute of Technology
No.2, March, 1992
The Imperative to Restore Nature:
Some Philosophical Questions
Lisa Newton
Fairfield University
---------- 30 ----------
---------- 31 ----------
No.3, May, 1992
Lying: A Failure of Autonomy and Self-Respect
Jane Zembaty
The University of Dayton
No.4, June, 1992
National Health Insurance Proposals:
An Ethical Perspective
Alan O. Kogan, M.D.
Kalamazoo, Michigan
VOLUME VI
No.1 & 2, November, 1992
Arguing for Economic Equality
John Baker
University College, Dublin, Ireland
No.3 & 4, May, 1993
Reasonable Children
Michael Pritchard
Western Michigan University
No. 5 &6, June, 1993
Helping to Harm? The Ethical Dilemmas
of Managing Politically Sensitive Data
Sylvie C. Tourigny
Western Michigan University
VOLUME VII
No.1, September, 1993
Why Does Utilitarianism Seem Plausible?
John Dilworth
Western Michigan University
No.2, November, 1993
Can We Share Ethical Views with Other
Religions?
Robert Hannaford
Ripon College
---------- 32 ----------
. 2, ve ber,  
  re thical i s it  t er 
ligions? 
ert naford 
 llege 
----  ----
Robert Hannaford
Professor of Philosophy
Ripon College
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